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1. LegaL framework
The main media and communications regulatory body in the UK is the Office of 
Communications (Ofcom), with offices in London. Ofcom is a statutory body, organizationally 
separated from government and operating at arm’s length from it, created by the Office 
of Communications Act 20021. Its main powers and functions were conferred on it by the 
Communications Act 20032, which sets out no less than 263 separate statutory duties3. 
Ofcom is accountable to Parliament to which it reports on its activities annually. As will 
be detailed below, Ofcom has regulatory duties across most of the ‘converging’ electronic 
communications sector, often in an advisory capacity to government in areas such as media 
ownership rules and public service broadcasting, and is in charge of implementing and 
enforcing legislation. Other Acts of Parliament under which Ofcom operates include the 
Broadcasting Acts 19904 and 19965, the Human Rights Act 19986, the Enterprise Act 20027, 
the Wireless Telegraphy Act 20068, and the Digital Economy Act 20109.
There are other governmental and non-governmental bodies that have powers and 
duties in relation to media and communications matters. The two main government depart-
ments with policy responsibilities over media and communications are the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS). The two general competition authorities, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the 
1 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/11/contents
2 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents
3 See ‘A Case study on Public Sector Mergers and Regulatory Structures’, available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/
what-is-ofcom/a-case-study-on-public-sector-mergers-and-regulatory-structures/
4 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/42/contents
5 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/55/contents
6 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents
7 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents
8 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/36/contents
9 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/24/contents
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Competition Commission, also undertake competition investigations in media and commu-
nications markets, where Ofcom has concurrent powers. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, there are a number of industry bodies 
operating either self-regulatory or co-regulatory schemes in relation to various aspects 
of media and communications regulation (with Ofcom, in the latter case, acting as ‘back-
stop regulator’)10. These include: the Press Complaints Commission (PCC); the Advertising 
Standard Authority (ASA); the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF); the Authority for Television 
On Demand (ATVOD); the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC); PhonePayPlus; the 
Independent Mobile Classification (IMCB).
This report will focus on Ofcom as the main sectorial regulator but will also discuss 
Ofcom’s working relations with some of the above-mentioned bodies, in particular in areas 
of media and communications where co-regulatory arrangements are in place.
2. functions
Ofcom presides over most of the converging electronic communications sector, 
including broadcasting, telecommunications and wireless communications services (i.e., 
management of the radio spectrum). Its creation in 2003 involved the merger of five pre-
existing regulators responsible for specific areas of media and telecommunications regula-
tion. Under the pre-Ofcom regulatory regime, television regulation was divided between 
the Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), responsible in matters of standards and fair-
ness, and the Independent Television Commission (ITC), a statutory body that licensed and 
regulated commercial television services, and whose responsibilities included economic 
regulation, advertising regulation and public service obligations. The other three ‘legacy’ 
regulators that Ofcom replaced were: the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel, a non-minis-
terial government department responsible for the licensing and regulation of telecommu-
nications operators); the Radio Authority (a statutory body responsible for the regulation 
of commercial radio broadcasting); and the Radiocommunications Agency (a departmental 
agency responsible for allocation and supervision of the radio spectrum)11.
Ofcom was created in anticipation of technological and market convergence 
(Smith 2006). Its advocates (e.g., Collins and Muroni 1996) argued that a single regula-
tor encompassing both broadcasting and telecommunications would contribute to the 
simplification and rationalization of the regulatory framework, and would reduce costs 
and inefficiencies12. 
Ofcom’s functions and duties are wide-ranging. In relation to media regulation, they 
include:
10 See Ed Richards, ‘Models of Media Regulation’, 5 October 2011, available at: http://media.ofcom.org.uk/files/2012/02/Teach-
in-presentation-by-Ed-Richards-05-10-11.pdf
11 Since 1 October 2011, Ofcom has also been given responsibility over postal services, having taken over from the previ-
ous regulator Postcomm. The relevant legislation is The Postal Services Act 2011. See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2011/5/contents
12 On the other hand, critics warned against the danger that a single regulator would concentrate too much power and that 
there would be uncertainty over its hierarchy of values, having to oversee sectors (broadcasting and telecommunications) 
with different regulatory traditions (see Section 3 below).
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• Licensing of all radio and television broadcasters, and monitoring compliance with 
the conditions set out in the licenses, including a duty to be satisfied that persons 
holding broadcasting licences are ‘fit and proper’;
• Setting standards for television and radio programmes on matters relating to 
taste, fairness and privacy, and monitoring broadcasters’ compliance with Ofcom’s 
Broadcasting Code;
• Reviewing Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) at least every five year13; 
• Reviewing Media Ownership Rules at least every three years14;
• Concurrent competition powers with OFT in respect of anticompetitive agreements 
and abuses of a dominant position in the sectors regulated by Ofcom;
• Evaluating ‘media public interest considerations’ in relation to certain media merg-
ers, triggered by an intervention notice issued by the Secretary of State;
• Regulating the scheduling of broadcasting advertising, sponsorship, and product 
placement; 
• Promoting media literacy, primarily through the undertaking of research to inform 
policy;
• More recently, establishing a framework to implement provisions in the Digital 
Economy Act 2010 around online copyright infringement, one of Ofcom’s 2012/13 
strategic priorities15.
Under the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom has also been given some regulatory 
powers over the BBC. This has marked a departure from the self-regulatory regime histori-
cally governing the UK’s main public service broadcaster. Regulatory responsibilities are 
now divided between Ofcom and the BBC Trust, ‘the sovereign body within the BBC’16. 
Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code applies to the BBC, as well as commercial broadcasters, but 
only in respect of standards on harm and offence, privacy and fair treatment. The BBC Trust 
retains responsibility over matters of accuracy and impartiality in news and current affairs 
programming. Under the BBC’s New Charter and Agreement that took effect in 2007 and 
remains valid until 2016, Ofcom is also responsible for conducting market impact assess-
ment for proposed new BBC services or for significant changes to existing ones. Market 
impact assessments are one of the two elements of the Public Value Tests, the other being 
the Public Value Assessments undertaken by the BBC Trust. Finally, Ofcom is in charge, 
concurrently with the BBC Trust, of monitoring BBC’s compliance with obligations relating 
to independent television production quotas, as well as news and public affairs quotas, 
programming for the nations and regions, and quotas for original productions.
13 Under the Communications Act 2003, all terrestrial broadcasters, namely BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5, are designated 
as ‘public service broadcasters’, irrespective of their ownership and funding. Ofcom has completed two major PSB reviews so 
far. 
14 The present UK’s Coalition government is considering reducing the frequency of both the public service broadcasting and 
media ownership rules reviews, as part of its broader agenda to reduce the budget, size and scope of activities of independ-
ent regulatory authorities (see Lunt and Livingstone 2012).
15 See ‘Ofcom Annual Plan 2012/13’, available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/files/2012/03/Annual_Plan_2012-13.pdf
16 See ‘Memorandum of Understanding between Ofcom and the BBC Trust’, available at: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/
how-ofcom-is-run/committees/ofcom-bbc-joint-steering-group/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-office-of-
communications-ofcom-and-the-bbc-trust/
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In a number of areas Ofcom has delegated powers to industry regulatory bodies 
establishing what are referred to as ‘co-regulatory partnerships’. This is in accordance 
with the legislative mandate. Under the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom is required to 
promote the development of self-regulation. Since Ofcom’s creation, there has indeed been 
a move towards a greater role for ‘self-regulation’, although, in fact, the arrangements put 
in place are better described as ‘co-regulatory’ since Ofcom, as the statutory regulator, typi-
cally retains certain powers and responsibilities. An important area where a ‘co-regulatory 
partnership’ has been put in place is the regulation of broadcasting advertising standards. 
Ofcom devolved the exercise of this function to the Advertising Standard Authority (ASA) 
in November 200417. The regulation of sponsorships remains under Ofcom’s responsibility, 
and so does the regulation of advertising scheduling, as already mentioned. The ASA is a 
non-statutory body funded by the advertising industry. Its main function is to regulate the 
content of all forms of adverting, sales promotions and direct marketing by investigating 
complaints and adjudicating whether advertising complies with its standards codes. As a 
‘backstop regulator’, Ofcom remains ultimately responsible for ensuring that broadcasters 
observe relevant standards and retains the power to require ASA to amend the code, which it 
did once in 2007 when introducing a ban on advertising for products that are high in fat, salt 
or sugar during children’s television airtime. Likewise, Ofcom must approve any change to 
the code recommended by the ASA. Finally, in the event of ASA failing to secure advertisers’ 
compliance with its decisions, Ofcom can step in and force compliance on broadcasters and 
impose sanctions.
An area where Ofcom has recently put in place similar co-regulatory arrangements is 
the regulation of on demand programme services (i.e., according to the terminology adopted 
by the European Union, non-linear TV-like services)18. These services are regulated under 
the Communications Act 2003 as amended in December 2009 to implement the European 
Union’s 2007 Audio Visual Media Service Directive. In 2010 Ofcom delegated powers to 
the Authority for Television On Demand (ATVOD) in matters of editorial content (regula-
tion of advertising on video-on-demand services is responsibility of the ASA). Like the ASA, 
ATVOD is a non-statutory body funded by a fee paid by on demand service providers, whose 
board comprises five independent and four non-independent (i.e. industry representatives) 
members. Its main task is to ensure that on demand service providers falling within the 
scope of regulation notify it and comply with its standards code in matters of incitement to 
hatred and protection of minors. Ofcom retains similar powers as those described earlier in 
relation to advertising, namely approval of the code and changes to it, as well as enforce-
ment powers.
To summarise, Ofcom’s duties and powers in relation to media regulation are wide-
ranging. Ofcom exercises its statutory functions either solely or through co-regulatory 
schemes involving industry bodies such as ASA and ATVOD as co-regulators. However, there 
are areas (Internet content, the press) and institutions (the BBC) that remain wholly or partly 
outside of Ofcom’s purvey. In the words of its Chief Executive Ed Richards, overall ‘Ofcom 
17 For an assessment, see Dacko and Hat (2005).
18 For a discussion see Dawes (2011).
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has extensive supervisory powers in relation to TV and radio broadcasting content. Our role 
in relation to Internet services is much more limited. We have only an extremely narrowly 
defined – and rarely triggered – role in relation to the regulation of newspapers. We have no 
role in relation to newspaper content’19. 
Regulation of newspaper content is currently a highly topical and hotly contested 
issue. In the wake of the News International phone hacking’ scandal20, in July 2011 the 
government set up a public enquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press led Lord 
Justice Leveson (the so-called ‘Leveson inquiry’)21. The UK press is currently self-regulated by 
the Press Complaint Commission, an industry body established in 1990 that is now widely 
regarded as toothless and ineffective. There are societal calls for subjecting the newspaper 
sector to statutory regulation, possibly involving Ofcom. But there is also strong opposition 
to statutory regulation of the press. The Leveson inquiry is expected to publish a report with 
recommendations to government for a more effective system of press regulation later in 
the year. At the time of writing (July 2012), the most likely outcome will be a strengthened 
system of self-regulation.
3. Legitimizing / underLying vaLues
The underlying values informing Ofcom’s regulatory activity are found in primary 
legislation. Section 3(1) of the Communications Act 2003 sets out Ofcom’s core purposes 
as follows:
It shall be the principal duty of Ofcom, in carrying out their function, a) to further the 
interests of citizens in relation to communications matters (i.e. matters in relation to which 
we have functions); and (b) to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where 
appropriate by promoting competition. (emphasis added).
In the words of Ofcom’s chairman Colette Bowe ‘meeting these two duties is at the 
heart of everything we [Ofcom] do’22. 
During the passage of the Act the question of in whose interest Ofcom should regulate 
(consumers versus citizens) was hotly debated and fought over in Parliament and outside it. 
This ‘discursive struggle’ over Ofcom’s core purposes is recounted by Peter Lunt and Sonia 
Livingstone (2012: 41-63). They argue that ‘what might, at first sight, seem to be mere seman-
tic struggles in fact pointed to a profound philosophical difference with very practical conse-
quences’ (p. 42). Civil society coalitions and defenders of public service-type and socially-
oriented regulation secured a major victory in Parliament when they managed to have an 
amendment passed that put citizen interest alongside consumer interest. Earlier drafts of 
19 See ‘Witness Statement of Ed Richards to the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press’, available at 
http://media.ofcom.org.uk/files/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Ed-Richards.pdf, p. 25.
20 The News International phone hacking scandal is an on-going controversy involving the defunct News of the World (closed 
in July 2011), the UK’s best-selling Sunday newspaper published by News International, a subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch’s 
News Corporation. As reported in the relevant Wikipedia entry, ‘employees of the newspaper were accused of engaging in 
phone hacking, police bribery, and exercising improper influence in the pursuit of publishing stories’. 
21 See http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/
22 See ‘Witness Statement of Colette Bowe to the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press’, available 
at http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Colette-Bowe.pdf
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the communications bill only referred to the interests of ‘consumers’. Such a redefinition of 
Ofcom’s core purposes went some way towards mitigating concerns that as a ‘convergent’ 
regulator Ofcom would give priority to an economic and competition-oriented approach 
to regulation of the kind applied to telecommunications. However, it did not contribute to 
resolve underlying ambiguities over Ofcom’s underlying values, and the hierarchy between 
them. Commentators have pointed out that Ofcom must ‘balance numerous broad and some-
times conflicting economic and cultural policy considerations’ (Doyle and Vick 2005: 77). It 
has also been noted that the Communications Act is generally informed by a deregulatory 
thrust and that among Ofcom’s regulatory principles is a ‘bias against intervention’ (see e.g. 
Hitchens 2006). Ofcom’s duty to further citizen interest, which can require a robust and 
interventionist approach to regulation, might thus be difficult to reconcile with the general 
thrust of the legislation. Lunt and Livingstone (2012) argue that in its interpretation of its 
core purposes, as reflected for instance in the institutional structures that it set up for itself, 
Ofcom has prioritized consumer over citizen interest. They note that from 2003 onward 
Ofcom ‘established institutional structures and roles relating to consumer policy’ (p. 50), but 
that ‘strikingly, little equivalent activity or accountability was forthcoming regarding actions 
to further citizen’s interests’ (Ibid), further commenting that ‘Ofcom gives the impression of 
being more comfortable dealing with consumer that with citizenship issues’ (p. 62), probably 
because the latter are difficult to define and less amenable to quantitative analysis.
Ofcom’s new strategic priorities, set out in 2011 in the context of a significant reduc-
tion in the regulator’s budget (see Section 7 below)23, seem indeed to point to the margin-
alization of social/cultural concerns in its policy agenda. Only one of these five strategic 
aims reflects citizen-oriented concerns (‘To provide appropriate assurance to audiences on 
[broadcasting] standards’), whereas three other priorities reflect Ofcom’s primary concern 
with economic-type regulation (‘To promote effective and sustainable competition’; ‘To 
promote efficient use of public assets’; ‘To help markets work for consumers’).
4. Performance
Information on the work undertaken by Ofcom during the year, and a self-assessment 
of its performance against the strategic priorities set in the annual plan, are found in Ofcom’s 
Annual Reports. The picture emerging from these reports is that of a very active and busy 
regulator, as evidenced, among others, by the number of public consultations and regula-
tory impact assessments undertaken annually (e.g., respectively, 47 and 46 in 2011/12), the 
enforcement activity in relation to television and radio content (7,551 cases assessed in 
2011/12) and the substantial investment in research, including annual reports and audi-
ence/consumer surveys (e.g., the Communications Market Reports) as well as ad hoc research.
There appears to be a clear division of labour between Ofcom and the industry 
bodies with which it has co-regulatory schemes, although of course this is not an assess-
ment of whether co-regulatory arrangements are more or less appropriate and effective 
23 See ‘Ofcom Annual Plan 2012/13’, available at:  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/annual-reports-and-plans/annual-plans/
annual-plan-201213/
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than statutory regulation. Ofcom’s Chief Executive Ed Richard has recently commented 
that ‘Ofcom’s experience of co-regulation to date has been mostly positive’24. Ofcom has 
developed a set of criteria for assessing whether any of its functions should be delegated 
to a co-regulatory body25. At the time of writing, Ofcom is undertaking a formal review 
and applying these criteria to evaluate how co-regulation of editorial content on demand 
programme services has worked since its inception in 2010 and whether the ATVOD remains 
‘an appropriate regulatory authority’26. 
5. enforcement mechanisms / accountabiLity
5.1. EnforcEmEnt mEchanisms
Ofcom has statutory powers27 to impose sanctions against a radio or television broad-
caster in the event of a breach of its code and/or the conditions of the broadcaster’s licence. 
The procedure is generally initiated by complaints from listeners and viewers. Ofcom has 
a duty to assess any complaint it receives. Individual complaints received by Ofcom are 
assigned to cases. In its latest Annual Report28, Ofcom revealed to have assessed 21,484 
complaints about harmful and offensive material in 2011/12 (‘broadcasting standards’) and 
288 complaints about unfairness and/or unwarranted infringements of privacy, for a total of 
7,551 cases. Ofcom does not uphold most complaints. For instance, in 2011/12, in relation 
to broadcasting standards cases, out of a total of 7,263 cases, 6,816 were either found not 
to be in breach of the Broadcasting Code or outside Ofcom’s remit. Some of the other cases 
(57) were ‘resolved’ (when a broadcaster takes immediate and appropriate steps to remedy a 
breach and Ofcom decides not to record it). The remaining cases were further investigated 
and 248 investigated cases resulted in breaches of the Broadcasting Code.
If it considers that a broadcaster has ‘deliberately, seriously, repeatedly and/or recklessly’ 
breached the Broadcasting Code or any other licence condition, Ofcom has the power to:
• Issue a direction not to repeat a programme or advertisement, or a direction to 
broadcast a correction or a statement of Ofcom’s findings;
• Impose a financial penalty (for commercial television or radio licensees, up to 
£250,000 or 5% of the broadcaster’s ‘Qualifying Revenue’, whichever is the greater);
• In the most severe cases, shorten, suspend or (in certain cases) revoke a licence.
In its latest Annual Report, Ofcom reports to have applied financial penalties in 10 
cases during the last financial year. In one case (More FM Ltd) the sanction was to reduce the 
period for which the licence is to be in force by a period of twelve months.
24 See ’Witness Statement of Ed Richards to the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press’, available at 
http://media.ofcom.org.uk/files/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Ed-Richards.pdf, p. 34.
25 See Ofcom (2008) ’Identifying Appropriate Regulatory Solutions: Principles for Analysing Self- and Co-regulation’, available 
at: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/coregulation/statement/
26 See ‘ATVOD Review’ available at: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/tv/video-on-demand/
27 Under the Broadcasting Act 1990 and 1996, and in some cases the Communications Act 2003, depending on the type of 
licence. 
28 See ‘Ofcom Annual Report 2011/12’, p. 112-115.
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Broadcasters and affected media workers can appeal against an Ofcom decision via 
the judicial system.
5.2. accountability
Ofcom is accountable to Parliament, but is intended to operate at arm’s length from 
the State. It has a statutory duty to publish an annual report and present it to Parliament. 
In the annual report, Ofcom must provide ‘a summary of the manner in which they have 
resolved conflicts arising from their general duties in “important” cases’. The annual report 
is made available on Ofcom’s website in July of every year29. Another mechanism through 
which the regulator is held accountable to Parliament is its duty to give evidence to parlia-
mentary committee inquiries. In the course of 2011/12, Ofcom gave evidence on issues 
ranging from privacy to media plurality, and from the future of investigative journalism to 
superfast broadband. 
Some of the regulatory principles informing Ofcom’s activities are intended to 
enhance its accountability to various stakeholders, and, more generally, public engagement 
and transparency in the regulatory process. Under the terms of the Communications Act 
2003, Ofcom’s statutory principles include:
• A duty to publish an Annual Plan, publicly reviewed and made available on the 
regulator’s website30, where strategic priorities and policy objectives for the forth-
coming year are clearly articulated;
• A duty to consult widely before deliberating and to assess the impact of proposed 
regulatory action;
• A duty to ensure that its interventions are ‘evidence-based, proportionate, consist-
ent, accountable and transparent in both deliberation and outcome’.
• A duty to undertake consumer and audience research, which, as noted by Lunt and 
Livingstone (2012), in addition to contributing to evidence-based policy-making, 
is also regarded by Ofcom ‘as a valuable means of reaching the wider public’ (p. 
79), especially ‘those who, for whatever reason, do not find themselves sufficiently 
represented among those parties who put themselves forward in the consultation 
process’ (Ibid). 
Lunt and Livingstone (2012) provide a careful and insightful assessment of Ofcom’s 
achievements in engaging the widest possible range of stakeholders, including civil society, 
consumer groups and individuals, through public consultation, research and meetings like 
the Consumer Forum on Communications, as well as some of the intrinsic limitations of 
these mechanisms working against the possibility of truly inclusive policy-making.
To embed consumer and citizen representation into the very structures of Ofcom, 
and thus further enhance its accountability towards the public, the Communications Act 
required Ofcom to establish, respectively, a Consumer Panel and a Content Board (for more 
29 See http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/annual-reports-and-plans/
30 See http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/annual-reports-and-plans/
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details over the structure and composition of these bodies see Section 6 below). Expected to 
represent citizen interests, the Content Board is essentially given responsibility over content 
broadcasting regulation, in a rather dubious equation of citizen interest with merely broad-
casting issues (see Lunt and Livingstone 2012). In the words of its former chairman, the 
Content Board is charged with ‘understanding, analyzing and championing the voices and 
interest of the viewer, the listener and citizen’ and examining ‘issues where the citizen inter-
est extends beyond the consumer interest with focus on those aspects of the public interest 
which competition and market forces do not reach’31.
The Consumer Panel (renamed Communications Consumer Panel in 2008) is in 
charge to represent specifically the interests of consumers to Ofcom, as well as Parliament, 
government and European institutions. Lunt and Livingstone (2012: 75) note that the 
Communications Consumer Panel ‘may be seen to embed the concerns of statutory civil 
society body within the regulator’. The areas of consumer interest covered by the Panel 
explicitly exclude matters related to broadcasting and other type of content delivered over 
electronic communications networks32. 
6. institutionaL organization / comPosition
Ofcom’s main decision-making and governing body is the Board responsible for provid-
ing overall strategic direction. Under the Office of Communications Act 2002, the Board 
consists of up to ten members, a majority of whom are non-executive members including a 
Chairman and up to three are executive members (including the Chief Executive). 
The Chairman and the non-executive members are appointed by the government in 
the person of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport for a period of five years. 
In turn, the Chairman and other non-executive members of the Board appoint the Chief 
Executive (subject to the approval of the relevant Secretary of State). They also appoint any 
other executive Board member from among Ofcom’s employees. 
Ofcom’s Executive Committee, led by the Chief Executive, is responsible for running 
the organization and is accountable to the Board. It operates alongside Ofcom’s Policy 
Executive, which also comprises senior executives and is responsible for the development 
of Ofcom’s overall regulatory agenda and providing a forum for discussion.
Charged with the task of performing functions related to broadcasting content and 
media literacy, the Ofcom Content Board is a committee of the main Board comprising ten 
members appointed by the Ofcom Board. A majority of its members is made up of individu-
als who are neither members nor employees of Ofcom, some of whom must have extensive 
broadcasting experience. The chairman and at least one other member of the Content Board 
must be non-executive members of the Board (other than their chairman). The Content 
Board must also include a representative for each of the nations (England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland). 
31 See ’Witness Statement of Philip Graph to the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press’, available at 
http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Philip-Graf.pdf
32 For an assessment of the role of consumer representation in communications policy-making in the UK see Tambini (2012). 
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As discussed in Section 5 above, consumer interest is instead championed by 
the Communications Consumer Panel, a policy advisory group established under the 
Communications Act 2003, independent of Ofcom but ‘resourced and administered from 
within Ofcom’ (Lunt and Livingstone 2012: 75). As stated on its website, ‘The Panel is made up 
of independent experts with experience from many different fields: consumer advocacy, regu-
lation, the third sector, academia, the trade union movement, market research and industry’33. 
Internally, Ofcom has recently been reorganized into seven ‘groups’ whose directors 
report directly to Ofcom’s Chief Executive34: 
• Content;
• International and Regulatory Development;
• Legal; 
• Consumer; 
• Strategy, Chief Economist and Technology; 
• Competition Policy; Spectrum Policy; 
• Operation. 
As of 31 March 2011, Ofcom had 720 employees, down from 873 in 2010. In the course 
of 2011 Ofcom implemented a redundancy plan in order to reduce staff costs and meet 
savings targets required by government (see Section 7 below).
7. funding   
Ofcom is funded by a combination of government funding and industry fees35. Total 
income for the year ending on 31 March 2011 was £144m. Two thirds of that income came 
from government, specifically a grant-in-aid from the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS), totaling 93.8m. This is supplemented by a small grant-in-aid from the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to cover Ofcom’s activities in respect of 
media literacy (amounting to £0.5m in 2010/11)36. The remaining one third of Ofcom’s 
income is generated through fees paid by the industry, namely telecommunications opera-
tors (‘network and services administrative and application fees’) and broadcasting licens-
ees (‘Broadcasting Act licence and application fees’). In 2010/11, telecommunications and 
broadcasting amounted to £28m and £20m respectively. 
Nearly 50% of the total costs incurred by Ofcom in 2010/11 were staff costs (sala-
ries, benefits, pensions and national insurance costs). The rest of the regulator’s operating 
costs were incurred in respect of several activities, most significantly: professional fees, 
outsources services, audience and consumer research, spectrum clearance scheme, premises 
33 See http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/
34 See Oxford Media Convention. Speech by Ed Richards, January 24, 2011, available at: http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2011/01/24/
oxford-media-convention-speech-by-ed-richards/
35 See ‘Ofcom Annual Report 2010/11’, Section D, available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/annual-reports-and-plans/
annual-reports/annual-report-2010-11/. Ofcom Annual report is published in July and is available in English and Welsh. 
Information provided in this section comes from Ofcom’s 2010/11 Annual Report.
36 The role of main sponsor body was assigned to DCMS from BIS from 01 April 2011.
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costs, administration and office expenses, information and technology costs, and amortisa-
tions and depreciations. 
Ofcom has not been spared by the major public sector cuts implemented by the UK’s 
present Coalition government in response to the financial crisis. The regulator has been 
required to significantly reduce its expenditure. The result of an internal review completed 
in February 2011 was to identify savings, entailing significant job losses, intended to reduce 
Ofcom’s budget by 28% in real terms over the following four years beginning from April 
2011. Ofcom’s total budget for 2011/12 was set at £115.8m. The reduction in the budget 
was made possible, as put by Ofcom in its Annual Report, through ‘a combination of effi-
ciencies, streamlining project management and governance and ceasing some activities 
altogether’37. As an example of an area where Ofcom might be asked to do less, the Annual 
Report mentions the Government’s proposal to reduce the frequency of media ownership 
and public service broadcasting reviews (currently every three and five years respectively). 
But the report also notes that, at the same time, Ofcom has been asked to take on new 
responsibilities, for example, implementing the provisions in the Digital Economy Act and 
the regulation of postal services.
8. reguLation in context
Some of the key, distinctive features of the UK media and communications system 
include:
• A strong tradition of public service broadcasting. In the UK all terrestrial broadcast-
ers, namely BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel Five, are designated as ‘public service 
broadcasters’, irrespective of their ownership and funding (ITV, Channel 4 and 
Channel 5 are commercially funded, and ITV and Channel5 are for-profit companies). 
As public service broadcasters, they are required to fulfill public service obliga-
tions, although in recent years these have been reduced for the commercial public 
service broadcasters (especially ITV and Channel Five). UK’s main public service 
broadcaster is the BBC, publicly funded via the licence fee and operating under the 
most comprehensive public service remit of all UK’s ‘public service broadcasters. By 
international standards, the BBC is a very well-resourced public broadcaster and 
enjoys relative independence of government;
• The comparatively minor role played by local media vis-à-vis national media (both 
in the press and broadcasting sectors);
• Generally, a high take-up of new communications technologies, including digital TV 
(94% of homes in 2011), and broadband Internet (76% of homes in 2011);
• A wealthy market – e.g., the UK is by far the largest pay-TV market in Europe; online 
advertising revenues are the highest in Europe. 
• A newspaper market characteristically divided into the tabloid/popular and broad-
sheet/quality segments, the latter displaying high professional standards, while 
the former, the largest segment in terms of circulation and readership, now at the 
37 See ‘Ofcom Annual Report 2010/11’, p. 40.
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center of controversy over its practices and professional standards.  The phone-
hacking scandal which erupted in the course of 2011 revealed widespread unethi-
cal, and even illegal practices among tabloid journalists and led to the closure in 
July 2011 of the best selling Sunday newspaper, News of the World (owned by Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corp);
• High level of press and cross-media ownership concentration, with Rupert Murdoch’s 
News Corp controversially holding a dominance position in both the national news-
paper and pay-TV sectors (respectively through News International and BSkyB).
In keeping with its commitment to researching communications markets ‘constantly’ 
(one of its regulatory principles), Ofcom provides a rich source of updated figures and data 
on the UK media and communications markets, technologies and audiences, notably through 
its annual Communications Market Reports, Public Service Broadcasting Report and regular 
surveys of media consumption. This research is available on Ofcom’s website.
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